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EXPANDING EXPROPRIATION: THE SUBORDINATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
TO EMINENT DOMAIN IN St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal District. v. 




I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 Private property is a long-held principle in American law. One of 
the limitations placed on the right of property is taking private property 
under eminent domain, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. 
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the 
definition of public use under the clause to include such factors as tax 
revenue and economic development in the case of Kelo v. City of New 
London.1 In response to this expansion, a number of states decided to 
modify their constitutions and laws to limit the definition of public use to 
give greater protections of private property than what is guaranteed at the 
federal level.2 Louisiana was one such state. A state constitutional 
amendment was passed after Kelo which expressly prohibited the 
consideration of tax revenue, economic development, or any incidental 
public benefit when determining whether the taking of property under 
eminent domain was for a public purpose.3 The Louisiana Constitution also 
prohibits the expropriation of a business for the purpose of halting 
competition with a government enterprise.4 Unfortunately, Louisiana has 
not been as successful in limiting eminent domain in actual practice.  
 The limitations on the power of the state government and local 
governments to take private property was part of an effort to strengthen the 
property rights of individuals in Louisiana. However, in the case St. 
Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc., LLC, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court addressed these provisions of the Louisiana 
Constitution in a different light. This Note will analyze the majority and 
 
    * Stephen Marsalis is a 2020 graduate of Mississippi College School of Law. 
The author would like to thank Professor Mark Modak-Truran for his advice throughout 
the drafting of this Casenote. The author is also grateful to his friends and family for their 
support. 
    1. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
    2. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response 
to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009). 
    3. LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 4(B)(1) (2019); 2006 La. Sess. Law Serv. 851 
(West). 
    4. LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 4(B)(6) (2019). 
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minority opinions from the case, specifically, the court’s broad definition 
of public use, the factual circumstances surrounding the public port’s 
expropriation of Violet Dock Port, and the issues raised for private property 
owners by the majority’s holding. The Note will also highlight the diverse 
views on the acceptable interpretation of public purpose in eminent domain 
law. Finally, this article will highlight the potential solutions for the issues 
raised by the majority holding.  
 




 Since 2001, the St. Bernard Port (“The Port”), a public port, 
experienced greater demand for handling cargo.5 The Port handles various 
types of cargo in its operations and is one of the busiest ports in the United 
States.6 The Port started to run out of space for its operations, and its 
customers desired more space, as well as a facility for liquid cargo.7 With 
operations nearly at capacity, the Port sought 75 acres of land (“Property”) 
along the Mississippi River in order to expand.8 The Port determined that 
the Property in question, which was owned by Violet Dock Port, Inc., 
L.L.C. (Violet), was more suitable for handling large cargo ships than other 
sites due to the Property’s shape and depth of its water.9 The land was also 
satisfactory because the Port would be able to have a cargo facility close to 
a rail line.10 All other available properties in St. Bernard Parish were 
inadequate for the Port’s needs for a facility on the river.11  
 At that time, the Property also had five berths, a “parking lot for 
ships,” which Violet utilized for ship berthing, mooring, and repairs.12 
Violet had a contract with the Military Sealift Command, a civilian branch 
of the United States Navy, to berth13 and repair oceangoing vessels.14 In 
2007, the Port made an offer to Violet to purchase the Property in the 
 
    5. St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc., 239 
So. 3d 243, 246 (La. 2018). 
     6. Id. 
     7. Id. 
     8. Id. at 246-47. 
     9. Id. at 247. 
   10. Id. 
   11. Id. 
   12. Id. 
   13. Berthing is “to bring (something, such as a ship or automotive vehicle) into 
a berth,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/berthing, (Feb. 15, 2019). 
   14. St. Bernard Port, 239 So. 3d at 247. 
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amount of $10 million.15 The next year, the Port arrived at a tentative deal 
with Violet for Violet to sell the Property for $14 million.16 Two years later, 
the Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development’s Port Priority 
Program gave the Port a $15 million grant to be used in the Property’s 
acquisition.17 The Port offered to pay Violet the fair market value of $16 
million, which Violet rejected in favor of seeking a purchase price of $35 
million from the Port.18 Negotiations then failed, and the Port began 
proceedings for expropriation19 of the Property.20  
 
B. Procedural History 
 
 The Port filed a petition in December 2010 to expropriate the 
Property and made a deposit of $16 million in the District Court’s registry, 
which the petition stated was for expansion of the Port’s facilities.21 The 
petition asserted that construction of the Port’s expansion would take eight 
to ten years to accomplish, and that during that time, the Port would try to 
form a new contract with the U.S. Navy.22 Violet removed the case to 
federal court based on Violet’s contract with the Navy asserting the Port’s 
expropriation was under the color of federal law.23 The district court 
rejected Violet’s removal arguments and remanded the case to state court, 
holding that the Port’s naval contract did not account for its expropriation 
of all of Violet’s property, merely a small part of it.24  
The state trial court held that the expropriation was not for the 
purpose of taking Violet’s lease with the Navy but was for the construction 
of a terminal to permit transport of bulk commodities.25 The court also held 
that the Port’s expropriation was part of an extension of services in the 
Parish.26 Violet appealed this ruling to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals and the Louisiana Supreme Court, both of which denied the 
 
  15. Id. 
   16. Id. 
   17. Id. 
   18. Id. 
   19. Expropriation is “the action of the state in taking or modifying the property 
rights of an individual in the exercise of its sovereignty,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/expropriation, (May 12, 2019). It is 
another term for the use of eminent domain. 
   20. St. Bernard Port, 239 So. 2d at 247. 
   21. Id. 
   22. Id. at 247-48. 
  23. Id. at 248. 
   24. Id. 
   25. Id. 
   26. Id. 
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appeals.27 The case then went to trial for the valuation of the Property with 
the court establishing just compensation at $16 million.28 This was based 
on the Port’s experts’ assertions that the Property’s best use was for 
layberthing and aggregate operations, while Violet argued compensation 
should be $51 million to $67 million.29 A divided court of appeals panel 
upheld the district court’s ruling.30 The majority holding reasoned that the 
trial record supported the trial court’s ruling, while one judge dissented.31 
Violet moved for a rehearing of the matter which the court of appeals 
denied.32 The Louisiana Supreme Court then granted writ to hear Violet’s 
appeal.33  
 
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW 
 
A. Federal Jurisprudence 
 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “private 
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”34 
Like the rest of the Bill of Rights, the Takings Clause was initially applied 
only to the federal government.35 However, the Supreme Court began to 
apply the provisions of the Bill of Rights over time via incorporation under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The first provision to be incorporated was the 
Takings Clause in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of 
Chicago.36 There, the Court held that a state taking private property for 
public use without providing just compensation violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 The Court has reasoned that the 
Takings Clause serves the purpose of “bar[ring] Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
 
   27. Id. at 249. 
   28. Id. 
   29. Id. 
   30. Id. 
   31. Id. 
  32. Id. 
  33. Id. 
   34. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
   35. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding that 
since there is no express limitation on the state governments in the Bill of Rights, the 
amendments contained therein are only a restriction on the federal government, and do 
not apply to the states). 
   36. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 
U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
   37. Id. 
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should be borne by the public as a whole.”38 The Supreme Court has had 
difficulty deciding when government actions causing economic harm 
should be borne by the general public or only by a select few private parties, 
with such decisions typically depending on the facts of each case.39  
While the Takings Clause ostensibly serves as a limitation on the 
power of the government to take property, the restrictions of the clause have 
been weakened over time by broader interpretations of what constitutes a 
public use. In Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of 
such permissible public use takings. In that case, the Court held that the 
government may take private property from one owner and give it to 
another so long as it is part of a greater public purpose plan, including 
redevelopment of the particular area.40 This redevelopment can be to make 
an area of a city more aesthetically pleasing, in addition to traditional health 
and safety purposes.41 The Court reasoned that Congress could decide that 
the public interest might be better served by a private entity than a 
government department, and the Court could not state that “public 
ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of 
community redevelopment projects.”42 Once a public use has been found, 
the legislature has the requisite discretion to determine how much land to 
take and what nature it should be.43 It is not for courts to determine if such 
redevelopment plans only require taking buildings that are “unsafe, 
unsightly, or insanitary,” which are within the traditional police powers of 
the states.44 The Court further held, “[s]ubject to specific constitutional 
limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been 
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”45  
The scope of the Takings Clause was further broadened in Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff. There, the Court held that breaking up land 
concentrated in an oligopoly of landowners was a valid public purpose 
under the Fifth Amendment.46 Justice O’Connor gave the opinion of the 
Court, noting that “public purpose” is synonymous with the states’ police 
power and reasoning that land oligopolies cause “artificial deterrents” in 
real estate markets, which falls under the purview of government 
 
  38. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) 
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
   39. Id. at 124. 
   40. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
   41. Id. 
   42. Id. at 34. 
  43. Id. at 35-36. 
   44. Id. at 36. 
   45. Id. at 32. 
   46. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-42 (1984). 
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oversight.47 Courts have a limited role in reviewing eminent domain 
proceedings, and as long as eminent domain is “rationally related to a 
conceivable public purpose,” courts should defer to the public purpose 
determinations of legislative bodies.48  
The apex of the Takings Clause’s jurisprudence occurred in Kelo v. 
City of New London. In that case, the City of New London, Connecticut, 
attempted to acquire the property of various property owners to give to 
Pfizer, Inc. as part of an economic development scheme.49 The city had a 
high unemployment rate and hoped to create over a thousand jobs through 
its development plan.50 The New London Development Corporation 
(NLDC) was created by the city council to enact the plan and was 
empowered to utilize eminent domain.51 The land would be used for new 
residences, malls, and a hotel.52 The property owners had their property 
taken under eminent domain after the state supreme court upheld the 
takings as constitutional.53  
The United States Supreme Court upheld the takings by the City of 
New London, with Justice Stevens noting that the definition of “public use” 
had expanded over time, and that public use encompassed economic 
development by the government, as well as gaining additional tax 
revenue.54 The Court noted that private property may not be transferred to 
another private party with no justification.55 It cannot be merely to benefit 
a private party.56 However, property may be transferred to another private 
owner if a public use is the reason for the taking.57 The taking here was in 
pursuit of a well-planned development scheme and, thus, was not for the 
benefit of any particular individuals.58 In light of the entire plan, the city’s 
desire to remedy economic distress was entitled to the court’s deference.59  
The court specifically held that “[p]romoting economic 
development is a traditional and long-accepted function of government.”60 
This purpose is no less a public purpose than takings to eliminate blight or 
break up land oligopolies, and there is no basis for not including economic 
 
   47. Id. 
   48. Id. at 241. 
  49. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005). 
   50. Id. 
   51. Id. 
   52. Id. at 474. 
   53. Id. at 476. 
   54. Id. at 479; Id. at 483-84. 
   55. Id. at 477. 
   56. Id. 
   57. Id. 
   58. Id. 
  59. Id. at 483-84. 
   60. Id. at 484. 
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development as a public purpose.61 The court reasoned that public use of a 
property will commonly be a benefit to a private party, and government 
ownership of property taken under eminent domain will not always be the 
best option.62  
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor noted that the majority’s 
rationale would allow any private property to be taken by the government 
and given to another private party so long as it was used in a manner the 
government felt was better for the public.63 Under this “incidental public 
benefit” definition, there is virtually no distinction between public use and 
private use of property, thereby eviscerating the Fifth Amendment.64 The 
purpose of this clause was to protect property owners against a political 
majority.65 While courts grant great deference to legislative determinations 
of public use, they must still review the acts of the political branches if the 
restrictions of the Fifth Amendment are to have any real force.66 
Traditionally, public use has meant taking property for a government use, 
such as a road, or for a private actor, such as a railroad acting as a common 
carrier when the public will have access.67 In some cases, when the other 
criteria are not practical, takings are permitted when there will be a later 
private use, as was permitted in Berman and Midkiff.68 Those decisions are 
distinguishable from the present one, however, since both of them were 
directly addressing harms to the public, specifically those of blight and the 
concentration of land ownership.69 Here, there is no direct harm posed by 
the properties that were condemned in New London.70 The majority 
reasoning expanded public use to include incidental benefits, perhaps even 
for “esthetic” reasons.71 Such a definition means the Fifth Amendment does 
not contain any real limitations on the government’s power of eminent 
domain.72 The overly broad definition given shows that “public use” is not 
always the same as a state’s police power.73  
 
   61. Id. at 484-85. 
   62. Id. at 485-86. 
   63. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
   64. Id. 
  65. Id. 
    66. Id. at 497. 
   67. Id. at 497-98. 
   68. Id. at 498. 
   69. Id. at 500. 
   70. Id. 
   71. Id. at 501. Justice O’Connor also warns that, “if predicted (or even 
guaranteed) positive side effects are enough to render transfer from one private party to 
another constitutional, then the words ‘for public use’ do not realistically exclude any 
takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.” Id. 
   72. Id. 
   73. Id. at 501-02. 
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Justice Thomas made similar arguments against the new definition 
of public use in his dissent, while also arguing the decision was one in a 
line of cases intended to make the Public Use of the Fifth Amendment74 a 
“virtual nullity.”75 This is accomplished by the majority reinterpreting the 
Public Use Clause as the Public Purpose Clause, instead of upholding the 
clause as a “meaningful limit on the government’s eminent domain 
power.”76 Expanding the definition of public use too far would make the 
clause “surplusage.”77 Justice Thomas further argued that if government 
takes property, gives it to a private owner, and the public does not actually 
use it in some way, then it is not truly for a public use.78 Rather, the property 
must be utilized by the general public in some fashion in accordance with 
the historical meaning of the text.79 Historically, taking property for the 
removal of a public nuisance was distinguished from taking it for public 
use, with public use takings always requiring compensation.80 Justice 
Thomas then compared the word “use” in the Fifth Amendment with its 
inclusion in other parts of the Constitution, concluding that it should be 
defined more narrowly than the majority’s definition.81 Finally, Justice 
Thomas reasoned that the case would result in poor communities being 
 
  74. U.S. Const. amend. V (“private property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation”). 
  75 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
   76. Id. 
   77. Id. at 507. 
   78. Id. at 508. 
   79. Id. 
   80. Id. at 510 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 135 (1765); 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 275 (1827)). 
  81. Id. at 509-10 (internal citations omitted). Specifically, Justice Thomas 
notes: 
Article I, § 8 grants Congress power “[t]o raise and support Armies, but no 
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years.” 
Here again, “use” means “employed to raise and support Armies,” not anything 
directed to achieving any military end. The same word in the Public Use Clause 
should be interpreted to have the same meaning. Tellingly, the phrase “public 
use” contrasts with the very different phrase “general Welfare” used elsewhere 
in the Constitution . . . (“Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States”); preamble 
(Constitution established “to promote the general Welfare”). The Framers 
would have used some such broader term if they had meant the Public Use 
Clause to have a similarly sweeping scope. Other founding-era documents made 
the contrast between these two usages still more explicit. . . . The Constitution's 
text, in short, suggests that the Takings Clause authorizes the taking of property 
only if the public has a right to employ it, not if the public realizes any 
conceivable benefit from the taking. 
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unable to defend their property from being taken by private parties with 
greater political power.82  
 
B. The Louisiana Constitution 
 
Even before the reaction to Kelo v. City of New London, the 
constitution of Louisiana contained strong protections for property rights. 
When the Constitution of 1974 was adopted, its Declaration of Rights 
fundamentally altered the approach to constitutional rights in the state.83 
While the Constitution of 1921 had taken a collective approach to rights, 
such as referring to the rights of the people in general, the 1974 Constitution 
altered most of these provisions in favor of individual rights.84 It was noted 
by one of the drafters of the Declaration that state constitutions can create 
stronger protections than the federal constitution.85 Thus, the Declaration 
of Rights provided that its guarantees could not be disturbed by the 
legislature and even limited the police powers of the state in its language.86 
These guarantees included equal protection under the law and the right to 
property.87  
The 1974 Declaration contained the most restrictive limitations on 
the state’s power to take property of any state constitution of the time.88 The 
original Declaration provided:  
 
Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its 
political subdivisions except for public purposes, and with 
just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his 
benefit. Property shall not be taken or damaged by any 
private entity authorized to expropriate, except for a public 
and necessary purpose, and with just compensation paid to 
the owner.89  
 
The only exception to the property rights clause was for the taking of 
property, “necessary for levee and levee drainage purposes.”90 The 
Constitution of 1974 thus limited takings of private property significantly 
 
   82. Id. at 521-22. 
   83. Louis “Woody” Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 LOY. L. REV. 9, 9 
(1975). 
   84. Id. 
   85. Id. at 11. 
   86. Id. at 14-15. 
  87. Id. at 16; Id. at 19. 
   88. Id. at 19. 
   89. Id. at 19 n.50 (citing LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 4 (1974)). 
   90. Id. (citing LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 4 (1974)). 
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more than the requirements of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.91 The Constitution also provided the property owner must “be 
compensated for the full extent of his loss.”92 The Declaration further 
provided “[n]o business enterprise or any of its assets shall be taken for the 
purpose of operating that enterprise or halting competition with government 
enterprises. However, a municipality may expropriate a utility within its 
jurisdiction.”93 This clause serves to protect private businesses in the state 
from government takings which are merely meant to benefit government 
enterprises.  
 
C. Louisiana Jurisprudence 
 
 An important decision in Louisiana eminent domain caselaw came 
about in State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Bitterwolf. There, the State 
of Louisiana sought to expropriate a tract of land from the defendant in 
order to improve a state highway.94 Upon announcing it would be taking 
the property in the area for the highway, property values decreased in the 
area.95 Defendant purchased a tract of land to be expropriated in the future 
after the State’s announcement but before the expropriation.96 After the 
State filed a petition in court with $21,395.00 to be paid for compensation 
for the property, Defendant filed a response alleging just compensation was 
$75,000.97 The trial court ruled in favor of Defendant, awarding $41,662.96 
for the property obtained by the State and $29,917.01 for Defendant’s 
severance damages to his remainder.98 The court of appeals affirmed, 
holding that Defendant had the right to compensation for the property’s 
depreciation resulting from the State’s project.99 The appeals court reasoned 
that the statutory ban on taking into account changes in valuation of 
property resulting from the improvement proposed by the government 
applied to the defendant, even if the defendant’s purchase was after the 
government’s announcement.100  
The Louisiana Supreme Court took up the case to consider whether 
the statute applied to owners who purchased property after the government 
 
   91. Id. at 15; Id. at 21-22. 
   92. Id. at 23. 
  93. Id. at 24. 
  94. State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Bitterwolf, 415 So. 2d 196, 198 
(La. 1982). 
   95. Id. 
   96. Id. 
   97. Id. 
   98. Id. 
   99. Id. at 199. 
 100. Id. (citing LA. STAT. ANN. § 48:453 (1982)). 
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announced its plans to expropriate it.101 The court held that, “[t]he 
adjustment to market value required by this statute applies only to changes 
in value which occur subsequent to the expropriatee’s purchase of the 
property.”102 The court reasoned that an owner should not be able to gain a 
benefit by getting greater compensation than what he paid for property by 
purchasing it after he is aware of the government’s plans.103  
In State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Rapier, the court 
addressed how to determine the proper level of compensation. In that case, 
the Louisiana Department of Highways filed suit to expropriate land.104 The 
district court granted the Department’s expropriation claim and the 
Department’s deposit of $11,000 for just compensation.105 The owner 
argued the land was worth $87,000 since it could be utilized for residential 
use, and after a trial, the district court awarded the defendant compensation 
of $79,099.80, subtracting the $11,000 already paid by the Department.106 
The state court of appeals affirmed, and the case went to the Louisiana 
Supreme Court.107 The state supreme court held:  
 
[T]he proper measure of compensation is the market value 
of the thing taken, i. e., the price for which the property could 
be sold by a willing and informed seller to a willing and 
informed buyer in the condition in which it stood, as well as 
under the usual circumstances existing, at the time of the 
expropriation. Further, as it said, market value means the 
worth of the land considered in the light of its best and 
highest use, this being the most favorable employment to 
which the property is adaptable and may reasonably be put 
in the not too distant future.108 
 
 The court further noted that a property owner has the requirement 
to prove a claim for greater compensation.109 Applied to the facts of the 
case, the court found the defendant had proven his burden of showing the 
land was usable for residential property.110  
 
101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 203. 
 103. Id. 
 104. State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Rapier, 164 So. 2d 280, 281 (La. 
1964). 
 105. Id. at 281-82. 
 106. Id. at 282. 
 107. Id. 
108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 287. 
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D. The States’ Responses to Kelo v. City of New London 
 
In response to Kelo v. City of New London, the voters of the state of 
Louisiana approved a constitutional amendment that further limited the 
definition of public use. The Constitution already provided:  
 
Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its 
political subdivisions except for public purposes and with 
just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his 
benefit. Except as specifically authorized by Article VI, 
Section 21 of this Constitution property shall not be taken or 
damaged by the state or its political subdivisions: (a) for 
predominant use by any private person or entity; or (b) for 
transfer of ownership to any private person or entity.111  
 
After the reforms, it further provides, “Neither economic 
development, enhancement of tax revenue, or any incidental benefit to the 
public shall be considered in determining whether the taking or damaging 
of property is for a public purpose pursuant to Subparagraph (1) of this 
Paragraph or Article VI, Section 23 of this Constitution.”112 Thus, the state 
constitution expressly prohibits the broad interpretation of public purpose 
handed down in Kelo.113  
The Louisiana Constitution does allow for ports to expropriate 
property, which was the issue in the instant case. The clause states that to 
facilitate industry, local governments, terminal districts, and public ports 
may “acquire, through purchase, donation, exchange, and expropriation, 
and improve industrial plant buildings and industrial plant equipment, 
machinery, furnishings, and appurtenances, including public port facilities 
and operations which relate to or facilitate the transportation of goods in 
domestic and international commerce.”114 Nevertheless, the other 
provisions of the state constitution still prohibit elements such as tax 
revenue from being considered as a factor in determining public use, as well 
as prohibiting the government from halting competition with business 
enterprises.115  
In addition to Louisiana, many other states have passed legislation 
or constitutional amendments to limit eminent domain powers with varying 
 
 111. LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 4(B)(1) (2019). 
 112. Id. art. I, § 4(B)(3) (2019). The provision was added after the Kelo 
decision. 2006 La. Sess. Law Serv. 851 (West). 
 113. St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc., 239 
So. 3d 243, 257 (La. 2018) (Weimer, J., dissenting). 
 114. LA. CONST. ANN. art. VI, § 21(A)(4)(b) (2019). 
115. Id. art. I, § 4(B)(3), (2019) 
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degrees of success. These reforms were mixed in their effectiveness at 
preventing the potential use of Kelo’s interpretation of eminent domain.116 
States who increased private property protections typically did so through 
citizen-initiated popular referendums.117 Louisiana appears to be the only 
state whose legislature approved a constitutional referendum to limit the 
definition of public use and further protect private property.118 One analysis 
found that while most states passed some reforms in the wake of Kelo, only 
eighteen enacted reforms that were effective at limiting at least some of the 
effects of the case.119  
One of the primary issues in limiting eminent domain abuse was 
that many state and local governments retained the ability to take property 
with minimal justification condemning property for issues like “blight” 
when they are banned from taking it for economic development.120 Another 
problem with the effectiveness of reforms is that a law will prevent the 
taking of property for private purposes but will still allow the taking of 
property by a private entity under the argument that it is for a public 
purpose, thus permitting the same kind of takings as Kelo with no additional 
protections.121 Louisiana is one of three states, along with Arizona and 
Oregon, that did enact reforms that banned takings for economic 
development along with greater restrictions on the definition of blight.122 It 
was also the only state to accomplish this through a legislatively-initiated 
referendum rather than a citizen-initiated one.123 The Louisiana 
Constitution does provide for eminent domain for “[t]he removal of a threat 
to public health or safety caused by the existing use or disuse of the 
property.”124 This provision does not allow for the taking of property for 
blight under any circumstance, but instead is limited to threats to public 
health and safety. Thus, taking property simply for aesthetic purposes is 
prohibited under Louisiana’s post-Kelo reforms.125 The Louisiana 
Constitution also provides that any unused property taken in eminent 
domain is to be offered for sale to the original owner or their heirs before 
being sold by the state.126 
 
116. Somin, supra note 2, at 2143. 
 117. Id. at 2143-44. 
 118. Id. at 2144. 
 119. Id. at 2115. 
 120. Id. at 2114. 
 121. Id. at 2120. 
 122. Id. at 2144. 
 123. Id. 
 124. LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 4(B)(2)(c) (2019). 
 125. The limitations on blight were added to the Louisiana Constitution in 2006, 
after Kelo. 2006 La. Sess. Law Serv. 851 (West). 
 126. LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 4(H). This section was also part of the post-Kelo 
amendments. 2006 La. Sess. Law Serv. 859 (West). 
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Some state courts have rejected Kelo’s rationale. The supreme 
courts of Ohio and Oklahoma both rejected the majority’s rationale in Kelo 
and held that their state constitutions did not allow for eminent domain for 
the purpose of economic development.127 The supreme courts of Ohio and 
New Jersey have also held that there are limits to condemnation of property 
for blight.128 Whether judicial scrutiny of the definition of public purpose 
was caused by Kelo is unclear, since there had been a trend in some courts 
in that direction for several years prior to the case.129 Four states—Illinois, 
Michigan, Montana, and South Carolina—ruled that economic 
development takings were prohibited by their state constitutions in the years 
leading up to Kelo.130 In fact, in the ten years prior to Kelo, only the 
Connecticut Supreme Court upheld eminent domain for economic 
development as a valid public purpose.131 Regardless, the trend among state 
supreme courts to address the issue has been to prohibit takings for 
economic development.  
 
IV. St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal District v. Violet Dock Port, 
Inc. 
 
A. Majority Holding 
 
 The key issue in St. Bernard Port was whether the expropriation of 
the Property by the Port was authorized by the United States and Louisiana 
constitutions.132 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, provides, “No 
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”133 The Louisiana Constitution provides that property, 
“shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions 
except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner . . 
. .”134 The court noted that expropriation of property must be made for a 
“public purpose” and provide “just compensation.”135 The majority noted 
 
 127. Ilya Somin, The Judicial Reaction to Kelo, 4 ALB. GOV’T. L. REV. 1, 7 
(2011). 
128. Id. at 13-14. 
129. Id. at 21-22. 
 130. Id. at 21. 
 131. Id. at 22. 
 132. St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc., 239 
So. 3d 243, 249 (La. 2018). 
 133. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
 134. LA. CONST. ANN. art I, § 4(B)(1) (2019). 
 135. St. Bernard Port, 239 So. 3d at 250. 
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that the trial court’s ruling would be overruled only if the factual findings 
were “manifestly erroneous.”136 The court focused on the issues regarding 
(1) public purpose, (2) the business enterprise clause, and (3) the just 
compensation clause.  
 
1. Public Purpose 
 
 The court noted that Kelo v. City of New London established that, 
under the U.S. Constitution, takings are for a public purpose when they are 
for economic development.137 However, following the decision, voters in 
Louisiana approved a state constitutional amendment to narrow the 
definition of public purpose for expropriations, which included 
expropriations for “public ports and public airports to facilitate the transport 
of goods or persons in domestic or international commerce.”138 The court 
held that it would not overturn the trial court’s factual finding that the Port’s 
expropriation was for a public purpose, as it was not “manifestly erroneous” 
for the trial court to do so.139  
 
2. The Business Enterprise Clause 
 
 Violet argued that the expropriation was in violation of the business 
enterprise clause of the state constitution, which states that “No business 
enterprise or any of its assets shall be taken for the purpose of operating that 
enterprise or halting competition with a government enterprise. However, a 
municipality may expropriate a utility within its jurisdiction.”140 Violet 
contended that the Port’s expropriation of the Property was to obtain 
Violet’s revenue from the lease with the Navy and to halt competition.141 
The court held that Violet’s cargo operations were actually “negligible.” 
Violet’s business was focused on layberthing, while the Port was engaged 
in the business of cargo.142 The court further noted that it would not 
overturn the trial court’s decision absent manifest error, and the decision 





 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.; LA. CONST. ANN. art I, § 4(B)(2)(b)(vi) (2019). 
139. St. Bernard Port, 239 So. 3d at 251. 
 140. Id. at 251; LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 4(B)(6) (2019). 
 141. St. Bernard Port, 239 So. 3d at 251-52. 
 142. Id. at 252. 
 143. Id. 
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3. Just Compensation 
 
 The court noted that the owner must be compensated when the 
government expropriates property.144 The formula for determining just 
compensation included taking into account “the full extent of the loss” as 
well as “the fair market value of the property,” which the court reasoned 
was defined as “the price a buyer is willing to pay after considering all of 
the uses that the property may be put to where such uses are not speculative, 
remote or contrary to the law.”145 In order to determine the value of the 
property, the court stated it considers the “most profitable use to which the 
land can be put by reason of its location, topography, and adaptability.”146  
 The court also reasoned that the use of the property at the time is 
assumed to be the best use, and the landowner has the burden of proof to 
show a different and superior use.147 Therefore, the court reasoned Violet’s 
use of the land when it was expropriated was considered the ideal use of the 
property, but Violet could overcome that burden by a preponderance of the 
evidence.148 The court concluded that the trial court erred in evaluating the 
testimony of experts’ valuation of the Property by choosing the Port’s 
experts over Violet’s experts.149 The court held that the finder of fact is 
allowed to examine the “strengths and weaknesses of expert testimony.”150 
The trial court’s decision was prejudicial to Violet by setting just 
compensation at the level determined by the Port’s experts, which was 
exacerbated by the appellate court’s failure to conduct a de novo review of 
the issue.151 The court remanded the case to the court of appeal solely for 
the goal of determining just compensation by taking into account the 
evidence of the case and the principles established by the court.152 On 
remand to the Louisiana Circuit Court, compensation was increased to 
“$28,764,685, together with interest and attorneys’ fees as provided for by 
law,” and then remanded to the trial court.153 The Louisiana Supreme Court 
 
 144. Id. 
145. Id. at 253 (citing LA. STAT. ANN. § 19:9(a) (2018); Exxon Pipeline Co. v. 
Hill, 788 So. 2d 1154, 1159 (La. 2001); West Jefferson Levee Dist. v. Coast Quality 
Constr. Corp., 640 So. 2d 1258, 1277 (La. 1994)). 
 146. Id. (citing Exxon Pipeline, 788 So. 2d at 1160). 
 147. Id. 
148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 254. 
 150. Id. (citing West Jefferson Levee Dist., 640 So. 2d at 1277). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 254-55. 
 153. St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc., 255 
So. 3d 57, 63 (La. Ct. App. 2018). 
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later denied a rehearing of the case.154 The plaintiff later petitioned for a 
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied.155  
 
B. Dissenting Opinions 
 
1. Justice Weimer 
 
Justice Weimer argued that the majority opinion upended the 
protections for private property enshrined in the state constitution and 
opened up businesses to a greater chance of government takeovers which 
will hamper businesses from engaging in economic activities that compete 
with government entities.156 Weimer noted the strict protections for private 
property that have been put into the Louisiana Constitution requiring 
expropriations be for a “public and necessary purpose” and the 
compensation be for the “full extent of [the owner’s] loss.”157  
The Business Enterprise Clause in Article I of the Louisiana 
Constitution further restricted the reasons private property may be 
expropriated, and the strict provisions of the state constitution were passed 
by voters to protect property from excessive government interference.158 
Weimer noted it is possible an expropriation may have the effect of shutting 
down a business, but this is permissible so long as the purpose of the 
expropriation is not made with that goal in mind, but rather the goal of a 
valid public use, such as a public highway.159  
Regarding the interpretation of the constitutional text, Justice 
Weimer began with the principle that “the starting point in interpreting 
constitutional provisions is the language of the provision itself and that, 
when the language of a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, 
that language must be given effect.”160 Examining the litigation history of 
the case, Justice Weimer noted that the Port wanted to acquire the Property 
to expand port services and to bring in “needed revenues” for the parish.161 
Weimer reasoned that the district court committed error in its analysis that 
 
 154. St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist., 255 So. 3d, reh’g denied, 2018 
La. LEXIS 729, at *1 (La. Ct. App. March 13, 2018). 
155. St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist., 255 So. 3d, cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 375 (2018). 
156. St. Bernard Port, 239 So. 3d at 255 (Weimer, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 255-56 (citing LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 4(B) (2019)). 
 158. Id. at 256-57. 
 159. Id. at 257. 
 160. Id. (citing La. Dep’t of Agriculture and Forestry v. Sumrall, 728 So. 2d 
1254, 1258 (La. 1999)). 
 161. Id. at 258. 
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necessitates a de novo review by the court.162 The record indicated that the 
trial court made no determinations on the facts or law regarding Violet’s 
argument that the expropriation of the Property was unconstitutional 
because it was done for the purpose of stopping competition.163 The trial 
court’s opinion also included economic factors that are specifically 
prohibited from the determination by Section 4(B)(3).164 The trial court 
chose instead to focus its analysis on whether the taking was for a public 
purpose while ignoring the issue of whether the expropriation violated the 
business enterprise clause.165 By affirming the ruling of the trial court, the 
majority disfavored the limitations prescribed by the business enterprise 
clause, despite the clause’s stated limitations.166 Takings of property must 
be construed strictly against the party attempting to take the property, which 
is consistent with the principles of the Louisiana Constitution.167 Weimer 
argued that, even without examining the record, by not taking into account 
the effects of the taking, the decision would permit any authority essentially 
unlimited power to take property so long as it showed an “ostensibly 
proper” reason for the expropriation.168 The majority’s actions were thus 
“constitutionally deficient” under the standards required by the state 
constitution.169  
Justice Weimer proceeded to analyze the expropriation under a de 
novo standard, noting that Violet argued the Port was taking the Property 
to operate Violet’s layberthing and use its docks for future cargo, which 
Violet was expanding on its own.170 Additionally, the Port noted in a letter 
to the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) that it 
would gain significant revenue from the Navy lease, essentially stating the 
contract could be used by the DOTD to determine the rate of return 
necessary for the Port to get DOTD funding of the project.171 When the trial 
of the instant case began, the Port had entered into a contract with the Navy 
for layberthing at the site.172 When the trial court determined just 
compensation, the Port argued, and the trial court held, that the ideal use of 
the property was not for cargo as the Port originally argued, but for 
layberthing with a terminal, which was the current use by Violet for the 
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Property at the time.173 Weimer argued that under the facts of the case, the 
Port expropriated the Property from Violet with the plan of using Violet’s 
existing infrastructure and customers for funding the expansion of the 
Port’s cargo operations.174 Since the Port expropriated the Property for this 
purpose, Weimer contended the expropriation was unconstitutional under 
de novo review.175  
Justice Weimer reached the same conclusion under the manifest 
error standard of review.176 While deference is given to the trial courts, 
Weimer argued that the appellate courts have the duty to determine if a trial 
court ruling is inconsistent with the evidence.177 The objective facts showed 
that the taking was going to eliminate Violet as a competitor, in spite of the 
Port’s subjective arguments to the contrary.178 Once the expropriation had 
been approved, the Port did an about-face and argued that the best use of 
the Property was for layberthing, which was what Violet had been using it 
for and was actively working to expand.179 The majority relied on the 
federal district court’s opinion, which held in favor of allowing the 
expropriation when it remanded the case back to the state court.180 The 
federal district court also favored, in Weimer’s opinion, a “primary 
purpose” test which was in contradiction to the plain language of the state 
constitutional provisions, a test which would eviscerate the protections of 
Section 4(B)(6).181 Justice Weimer argued the future consequences of the 
majority’s decision would allow future public ports to expropriate private 
ports so long as the public port was not currently engaged in the business 
of the private port.182 The Port’s taking of Violet’s property was against the 
letter and spirit of the Louisiana Constitution.183 Justice Weimer concluded 
the Constitution of Louisiana forbids the government from expropriating 
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2. Justice Guidry 
 
Justice Guidry’s dissent argued that the St. Bernard Port’s 
expropriation was an unconstitutional violation of the Business Enterprise 
Clause’s limitation in the Louisiana Constitution.185 Justice Guidry further 
contended that the trial court committed manifest error by finding the Port 
did not violate the business enterprise clause, since the Port’s plan was 
predicated on acquiring Violet’s assets and utilizing Violet’s layberthing 




A. Undermining the Declaration of Rights 
 
The Declaration of Rights in the Louisiana state constitution grants 
individual rights that are more limiting on the government than the 
corresponding limitations in the federal constitution. One of these 
provisions is the right to private property. In response to Kelo v. City of New 
London, the state legislature passed an amendment to further restrict the 
government’s power to take private property. This amendment was 
approved by the voters of the state in a general election. In St. Bernard Port, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court weakened private property protections and 
expanded the ability of the state government and local governments to take 
private property by ignoring the real issues in the case record, including the 
violations of the business enterprise clause and the economic development 
and tax revenue factors inappropriately weighed by the majority.  
 One of the reasons for the Port’s expropriation of Violet Dock Port 
was the desire to gain a contract with the Navy. However, the Declaration 
of Rights expressly prohibits a business enterprise being seized for the 
purpose of the government operating the enterprise or halting competition 
with a government enterprise. By failing to acknowledge the Port’s desire 
to gain a Navy contract, the majority overlooked a key goal of the Port, 
which is barred from being a valid reason. This dilutes the property 
protections guaranteed by Article I, Section 4(B)(6) of the state 
constitution. Based on this precedent, any government organization can 
seize a private business and stop competition with the government so long 
as the reviewing court can find some public purpose. The rationale allows 
reviewing courts to ignore the factual circumstances in favor of pretextual 
reasons cited by the government authority in question.  
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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This is further evidenced by the fact the Violet Dock Port was just 
as capable of gaining a contract with the Navy as the St. Bernard Port, as 
well as developing the Property for increased cargo capacity. Indeed, Violet 
was in the process of gaining a naval contract, and St. Bernard Port 
eventually sought to use the Property for the same purposes as Violet. 
Allowing the expropriation under the circumstances only exacerbates the 
problems in the case. It serves as an opportunity for the government to 
expend valuable legal and judicial resources taking private property for the 
same use that the private owner is using it for in the first place. It is thus 
economically inefficient as well as being dangerous to private property 
protections. Allowing an expropriator to switch the use of property gained 
under eminent domain after the fact to the original use by the private owner 
violates the business enterprise clause and permits government authorities 
to violate the letter and spirit of the state constitution.  
Another problem with the majority ruling is the economic 
development factors that were weighed by the court. The majority factored 
in issues such as government revenue and employment in the area when 
making its decision. This is a clear violation of Article I, Section 4(B)(3). 
This section was passed as a direct result of Kelo v. City of New London as 
a means of prohibiting the government from taking property merely for a 
purpose like increasing tax revenue. By weighing these considerations, the 
majority ignored the restrictions of Section 4(B)(3) and paved the way for 
future expropriations that raise the exact kinds of problems the provision 
was intended to solve. Similar to Kelo, under the majority ruling, any 
government entity can now potentially take property for the purpose of 
increasing tax revenue. If the St. Bernard Port precedent is followed, it 
could severely undercut the limitations of the clause.  
As Representative Jenkins noted, “[a] bill of rights in a state 
constitution can give protection to other rights not recognized by the 
Federal Constitution.”187 This is one of the primary reasons for the right to 
property under the Louisiana state constitution. The prohibition on 
factoring economic development as a public purpose was in direct response 
to a perceived inadequate protection of private property owners by the 
United States Supreme Court in its caselaw. This devotion to individual 
rights is reflected in Section 1 of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights which 
states, “[t]he rights enumerated in this Article are inalienable by the state 
and shall be preserved inviolate by the state.”188 This clause places the 
Declaration of Rights above the rest of the state constitution and constitutes 
 
 187. Jenkins, supra note 83, at 11. 
 188. LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 1 (2019). 
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a limitation on the police power of the state.189 The Declaration provides 
various other limitations on the government, such as a requirement for the 
government to pay property owners for the full extent of their loss and a 
ban on the seizure of personal effects (except for contraband).190 The 
provisions on private property and throughout the Louisiana Declaration of 
Rights comprise a broad protection of individual rights, greater than those 
afforded by the United States Constitution. Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court in the past has been willing to subject property rights to 
what amounts to a rational basis standard of judicial review.191 By ignoring 
the invalid reasons of St. Bernard Port for expropriation of Violet Dock 
Port, the majority in the case undermines and attempts to reason its way out 
of the enumerated individual rights in the state constitution. The people of 
the state, through the constitution, have entrusted the judiciary with the duty 
to protect certain fundamental rights against impermissible government 
constraint.192 They have chosen to accomplish this end by disallowing 
certain policies in the political process, even by the people’s elected 
representatives.193 The majority decision undermines this principle.  
 
B. Application of the Kelo Standard 
 
In Kelo, Justice O’Connor warned of the potential problems that 
would arise from an overly broad definition of public use that permitted 
takings for “esthetic” reasons.194 She reasoned that it could essentially 
remove the phrase “public use” from the Constitution if taken to its logical 
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conclusion.195 She also presciently warned that the majority opinion and 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence would be ineffective at preventing 
pretextual takings in the name of economic development given their 
deferential standards.196  
An example of the pretextual takings highlighted by Justice 
O’Connor was seen in 2006 in the Federal Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit where taking private property from owners who wanted to build a 
CVS Pharmacy was allowed, even though the private developer who 
condemned the property then proceeded to build a Walgreens Pharmacy.197 
Similar to O’Connor’s concerns, the majority opinion in St. Bernard Port 
threatens to effectively expunge the restrictions on public use from the 
Louisiana Constitution. If a court may ignore the clear indications that a 
taking of private property is for economic development, as St. Bernard Port 
did through its rationale for the expropriation, then any taking has the 
potential to be justified. While appropriate deference should be given to 
government entities exercising eminent domain, without proper judicial 
oversight (and for private entities exercising expropriation, as mandated by 
the Louisiana Constitution),198 the strictures of the Louisiana Constitution 
will serve as no more than “hortatory fluff.”199 Additionally, Justice 
Thomas’ warning is applicable here. He stated many poor communities 
could be disadvantaged in their ability to defend their property from being 
taken by the government under the court’s rationale.200 Applied to the 
instant case, many people with less financial and political influence will be 
unable to properly defend their property from expropriation, especially 
when courts are so deferential to other government authorities. Allowing 
eminent domain in those situations will likely result in “public use” takings 
that are “suspiciously agreeable” to powerful corporations.201 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Specifically, Justice O’Connor stated: If legislative prognostications about 
the secondary public benefits of a new use can legitimate a taking, there is nothing in the 
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Id. at 504. 
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Constitutional rights should be subject to a higher burden for the 
government to impose limitations on them.  
The rationale in St. Bernard Port risks making Louisiana’s 
constitutional reforms ineffective, similar to the attempts in other states that 
ended up permitting takings for blight.202 Furthermore, the majority ignored 
the trend in other states of increasing wariness by courts of government 
overuse of eminent domain. As previously noted, other state supreme courts 
have held their constitutions to prohibit economic takings both before and 
after Kelo,203 but the Louisiana Supreme Court here appeared to ignore the 
state constitution’s explicit repudiation of Kelo’s rationale. Allowing 
takings based on a pretextual public use gives the greatest possible 
deference to the expropriating government authority, which serves as an 
abdication of the duty of Louisiana courts to determine public use.  
Even under its broad definition of public use, the precedent of Kelo 
would still prohibit the takings in the case at bar. The Supreme Court in 
Kelo noted that a court should invalidate a taking that is carried out simply 
to benefit a private party.204 Justice Kennedy argued that a stronger test 
might be necessary for certain classes of eminent domain.205 This includes 
private transfers where there is a danger of “undetected impermissible 
favoritism of private parties;” although, economic development by itself 
would not justify this standard.206 On petition for a writ of certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court, Violet Dock Port noted that the primary 
purpose of the expropriation was for St. Bernard Port to transfer it via a 
lease to a private entity, Associated Terminals.207 The plan was then for 
Associated Terminals to operate the facilities since the facilities it was 
currently using were full.208 This type of eminent domain is the exact type 
that is prohibited under Kelo. It was for the purpose of taking Violet Dock 
Port’s property, which was already being used, to then give it to Associated 
Terminals. While Justice O’Connor’s sense of foreboding regarding the 
problems with the Kelo majority’s reasoning has been vindicated, the 
actions of St. Bernard Port are still a direct violation of even the lower 
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standards of Kelo, as well as the greater restrictions of the Louisiana 
Constitution.  
 
C. The Problem with the Manifest Error Standard 
 
 Manifest error as a standard of review is incompatible with the high 
burden the government should bear to exercise eminent domain. It is 
inconsistent with the precedent of multiple state supreme courts that have 
addressed the issue of appellate review of trial court determinations of 
public use, holding that public use determinations are to be assessed as a 
matter of law.209 If the Louisiana Supreme Court uses the lower standard of 
manifest error, it will contribute to the split among states over the review 
of eminent domain, which the United States Supreme Court will hopefully 
clarify in the future. More importantly, it makes property rights subject to 
where a person lives. If a local court makes a wrong decision, the burden 
of overcoming the lower court’s factual findings will often be too high for 
many people to protect their property rights. This standard bears the risk of 
making the Public Use Clauses of the federal and state constitutions subject 
to the whims of local city councils and expropriating authorities. So long as 
the state supreme court is unwilling to address these problems, people’s 
rights will be subject to the arbitrary determinations of local governments, 
which in many instances could be beholden to powerful political interests.  
 The manifest error standard is also inconsistent with the practice of 
the United States Supreme Court. The federal standard of public use 
determination, while deferential, is viewed as a judicial question.210 The 
state supreme court should follow the practice of the United States Supreme 
Court toward government actions that infringe upon individual rights by 
examining them under the light of judicial scrutiny. Given the reticence of 
the United States Supreme Court to apply the deference of the manifest 
error standard to eminent domain, the Louisiana Supreme Court would best 







209. See County of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family P’ship, 198 P.3d 615, 637 
(Haw. 2008); Southwest Ill. Dev. Auth. v. National City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ill. 
2002); Middletown Twp. v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331, 337-38 (Pa. 2007); Rhode 
Island Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., L.P., 892 A.2d 87, 96, 103 (R.I. 2006). 
210. Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930); U.S. ex rel. Tenn. Valley 
Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946). 
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D. The Solution 
 
1. Applying De Novo Review 
 
A better resolution to the case would be application of the de novo 
standard of review by appellate courts in the state. The state constitution 
vests courts with the responsibility to determine if a taking is for a public 
purpose. The Louisiana Supreme Court should review eminent domain 
appeals de novo as an issue of law rather than granting undue deference to 
the trial court. The burden should be upon the government to establish that 
an expropriation is for a public purpose. There should be a presumption 
against the government and in favor of individual rights, which would fulfill 
the constitutional guarantee that individual rights are “inalienable by the 
state and shall be preserved inviolate by the state,”211 and that “[n]o person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of 
law.”212 This standard would be in accord with the spirit of the law as well 
as the practices of the federal judiciary and many state judiciaries.  
 
2. Upholding the Declaration of Rights 
  
The court’s decision in the instant case weakened individual rights in the 
State of Louisiana. Remedy of the issue can be attained through proper 
enforcement of the strictures of the Declaration of Rights in the state 
constitution instead of abdication of the judicial role in protecting liberty. 
Applying de novo review would permit appellate courts to review all the 
facts of each individual case. Under that standard, the state supreme court 
would be able to see that the taking in the instant case was based on a desire 
to give a private business benefits rather than a valid public use. It would 
permit the court to dismiss inappropriate economic factors weighed by the 
lower courts as well. Finally, it would serve to affirm the will of the voters 
of the state to limit the authority of government in favor of greater 




 The power of eminent domain is an area of law that is ripe for abuse 
if it is interpreted too broadly. In response to Kelo, the people of Louisiana 
approved a state constitutional amendment to protect their property rights. 
Unfortunately, the St. Bernard Port case represents a retreat from that 
overarching principle. The majority ignored the St. Bernard Port’s desire to 
 
211. LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 1 (2019). 
 212. Id. art. I, § 2 (2019). 
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take Violet Dock Port to gain a naval contract. By failing to consider this 
factor, the majority disregarded the prohibition on government 
expropriations for the purpose of halting competition with a government 
enterprise. Violet Dock Port could have bid for the naval contract, and 
therefore, St. Bernard Port was barred from expropriating Violet Dock Port. 
When individual rights are in question, courts should not defer to 
overbearing government judgments.  
 Additionally, the majority also weighed inappropriate factors such 
as economic development and area employment. It also granted too much 
deference to the determinations of local courts and local government 
authorities by application of the manifest error standard of review. By 
taking these elements into consideration in their opinion, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court removed the force of the Declaration of Rights. By 
weighing these factors, the court has allowed for the disregard of property 
rights in favor of a broad definition of public purpose, the exact broad 
definition that the amendments were supposed to prevent. The majority and 
minority opinions furthered the debate over eminent domain that has 
continued since Kelo, a debate that will likely continue under the court’s 
current jurisprudence.  
 
